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mind that interacts with the created cosmos is incoherent. G&T assess such 
critiques and argue persuasively that the charges of incoherence are either 
just overstated (as no problems of a strictly logical nature are evident) or 
involve an illicit assumption of naturalist or physicalist tenets.
An appendix to the volume briefly develops and defends the so-called 
“Argument From Reason”—a perhaps more rigorous heir of the argument 
presented by C. S. Lewis and others—with the conclusion that naturalism 
is ultimately self-defeating since the view has implications that would un-
dermine the very arguments that might otherwise support it.
Overall, Goetz and Taliaferro have managed to explain and assess 
naturalism in a way that is at once concise, careful, and clear. I know of 
no other work engaging metaphysical naturalism that matches this one 
for these virtues. They allow leading naturalists to speak for themselves, 
sometimes at length, but mere “cut-and-paste” is avoided by skillful edit-
ing and lively interaction with the views discussed. The result is that the 
reader is likely to come away with a better understanding of the world-
view itself as well as the most significant difficulties that confront it. And 
the book is a model of careful philosophical argumentation and world-
view assessment. It should appeal to a wide audience that includes pro-
fessional philosophers, undergraduates and graduate students, seminar-
ians, pastors, and interested laypersons. And it should serve as a fine text 
for a number of courses, including introduction to philosophy, philosophy 
of religion, and apologetics. I have, for many years, taught a course titled 
Major Worldviews, which features naturalism and theism, among other 
views. This book should become a staple for such a course.
essays in the Philosophy of religion, by Philip L. Quinn. Edited by Christian 
Miller. Clarendon Press, 2006. Pp. 315. $49.95 (paper)
keVIN Meeker, University of South Alabama
This posthumously published collection of essays is the best of books and 
the worst of books. It is the best of books: Philip L. Quinn’s influential and 
thought-provoking essays provide a scintillating tour de force of some 
of the most important topics in philosophy of religion in the past four 
decades. It is the worst of books: It hauntingly reminds us that he is no 
longer with us to help us think through these important issues. Despite 
reminding us of our loss, this volume furnishes us with a golden opportu-
nity to consider the breadth and depth of Quinn’s omnifarious interests in 
the philosophy of religion.
The book begins with a memorably poignant foreword by Eleonore 
Stump. Editor Christian B. Miller, a former Quinn student, next offers a 
fine survey of Quinn’s life and work as well as the essays in the volume. 
The book reprints fourteen essays, divided into six sections that provide 
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a representative sample of much of Quinn’s work; it naturally includes 
some of his famous development and defense of the divine command/will 
theory of ethics. Sadly, I do not here have the space to discuss every essay 
(for a survey that briefly summarizes every essay, see Robert Roberts’s re-
view at http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=11964). So let me focus on some 
of the main motifs that run through many of the essays.
After reading this book, I was struck by the number of times that dis-
cussions of Kant or broadly Kantian issues occupied center stage. All 
three essays in the Topics in Christian Philosophy section discuss Kant 
extensively, with the last two advertising this focus in their titles: “Kantian 
Philosophical Ecclesiology” and “Christian Atonement and Kantian Justi-
fication” (which was selected by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the top 
ten philosophy papers of 1986). The section on Religion and Political Lib-
eralism contains two essays that spend a great deal of time critically ana-
lyzing the ideas of John Rawls, arguably the most famous neo-Kantian of 
the twentieth century. Moreover, even the title of the second essay in this 
section gestures towards Kant: “Religious Citizens within the Limits of 
Public Reason.” The last section on Religious Diversity contains “Towards 
Thinner Theologies: Hick and Alston on Religious Diversity,” in which 
Quinn offers a limited defense of the rationality of adopting some suit-
ably modified version of John Hick’s neo-Kantian pluralism. Of course, 
Quinn’s work on ethics and tragic dilemmas not only frequently discusses 
Kant but also promotes the Kantian primacy of the will over the virtues, 
most explicitly in his “The Primacy of God’s Will in Christian Ethics” (for 
an Aristotelian response, see Roberts’s review mentioned above).
Perhaps the most interesting and pervasive theme revolves around 
Kant’s treatment of killing on the basis of a divine command. In religion 
within the Limits of reason Alone Kant argues, roughly speaking, that one 
is never justified in killing someone on the basis of what one perceives to 
be a divine command because one could always be mistaken about the 
source or content of such a command. Even in the famous story of Abra-
ham and Isaac, Kant contends that Abraham (or anyone similarly situat-
ed) should have been so certain that it was wrong to sacrifice Isaac that he 
should have dismissed his experiences of God commanding him to do so 
as illusory or somehow mistaken. Quinn’s reflections on Kant’s discussion 
figure prominently in four of the six sections, including the first chapter 
“Religious Obedience and Moral Autonomy” as well as the last chapter 
“On Religious Diversity & Tolerance.” Although Quinn is certainly no ob-
sequious devotee of Kant on this point, he sees “promise in a chastened 
Kantianism that proceeds on a case by case basis to deploy moral beliefs of 
high epistemic status as levers . . . to move churches and their members in 
the direction of reforming ecclesiastical arrangements and reinterpreting 
scriptures” (p. 271). Along these lines he approves, to some degree, of fel-
low divine command theorist Robert Adams’s general “methodology that 
allows for ethical sources independent of theology to exert critical lever-
age on theological ethics” (p. 271). As I understand it, a crucial feature of 
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chastened Kantianism is that independent moral beliefs that fall far short 
of epistemic certainty may still function as levers to counteract religiously 
based arguments for what would otherwise seem to be an immoral prac-
tice. But implementing this strategy requires one to work harder to show 
that the independent ethical beliefs possess a higher epistemic status than 
any contrary beliefs. In his “On Religious Diversity & Tolerance,” Quinn 
interestingly applies this broad “piecemeal strategy” (p. 303) of chastened 
Kantianism to intolerant practices of any religion, drawing on the idea 
that the religious diversity of the world should significantly lower the jus-
tification one might have for believing that an intolerant practice is ac-
ceptable. This lowering of the confidence in one’s own religious practices 
presumably could allow norms from ethical sources independent of one’s 
theology to override one’s commitment to the intolerant practice.
It is unfortunate that this suggestion appears in the last essay he com-
pleted before his death. Exploring the many issues raised by this argument 
could prove most fruitful indeed. Taking a broad view of this chastened 
Kantian strategy, it is clear that one question immediately requiring an an-
swer is the following: What is the independent source of the ethical norms 
that are “to exert critical leverage on theological ethics”? Philosophical 
ethics seems a non-starter. After all, the Kantian hope of uniting rational 
agents of the world around a universally accepted form of practical reason 
that underwrites the epistemic strength of moral principles has fallen by 
the wayside, leaving us with what Quinn calls a “reasonable pluralism in 
moral theory” (p. 269). If it is reasonable to adhere to any number of these 
competing philosophical theories about morality, then some (particularly 
those within a particular theological tradition) may question whether any 
one of them could produce an ethical norm that has enough warrant to 
trump a contrary norm from theological ethics (or to make it rationally 
obligatory to abandon the norm from theological ethics). I take it that this 
problem is exacerbated if we consider Quinn’s own divine command/will 
theory as one of the philosophical theories about morality that one could 
reasonably adopt.
Of course few people look to philosophy to ground their moral judg-
ments. Many would contend that common sense can trump theological 
concerns by providing us with access to an independent source of basic 
ethical norms presumably shared by most ethical theories. More specifi-
cally, some could argue that the moral intuition that it is wrong, say, to 
sacrifice Isaac, is so strong that it can trump any purported divine com-
mand to the contrary (in a slightly different context Quinn seems to 
consider this way of arguing in his “Divine Command Ethics: A Causal 
Theory,” pp. 49–50). Interestingly, Quinn himself defends the possibility 
of Kierkegaardian conflicts (in which, roughly speaking, one must choose 
between following an indefeasible divine command and a conflicting 
moral requirement which is not overridden) against “common sense” ob-
jections. As he puts it in his essay “Moral Obligation, Religious Demand, 
and Practical Conflict,” “When philosophy succeeds in [bringing us to see 
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new possibilities], it teaches us that the world might be stranger by far 
than pedestrian common sense would allow” (p. 91). Moreover, Quinn 
also recognizes that one’s thoughts on these possible conflicts can be sur-
reptitiously influenced by one’s culture. While he defends the possibility 
that one could be justified in believing that one is facing a Kierkegaardian 
conflict, he candidly admits that he cannot imagine being actually justified 
in believing that he is facing a Kierkegaardian conflict. He concedes that 
this skepticism might
show that, being situated as I am in a predominantly secular culture, I can 
conceive of certain possibilities for justified belief that I cannot quite imagine 
being actual for me. If it showed this, I would be under pressure to admit 
that my culture has the power to shut me off from understanding imagina-
tively and firsthand the kind of faith needed to play the role of Abraham. 
And I would be reluctant to concede so much influence in determining what 
I can imagine to the contingencies of my culture. Like many intellectuals, 
I am inclined to fancy I can transcend, if only in imagination, most of the 
limits of my culture. But perhaps the range of my imagination is severely 
constricted just because I am to a large extent the product of an incredulous 
culture. (p. 91)
If Quinn is correct about the extent to which culture can affect even one’s 
imagination, then some might justifiably worry about the legitimacy of 
any independent moral leverage one tries to place on theological ethics.
In short, chastened Kantianism faces significantly high hurdles. Quinn 
himself has done such a tremendous job of chastening Kantianism that one 
might wonder if any meat remains on this theoretically thin skeleton of 
Kantianism that can nourish a research program. Moreover, his own de-
fense of divine command/will theories of ethics at times appears to insu-
late certain kinds of theological ethics from any Kantian heat, especially in 
an environment of “reasonable pluralism in moral theory.” Despite these 
high hurdles, I hope that philosophers of religion will further explore this 
topic, as well as many others that are broached by Quinn in these essays, 
even if they do not agree with all of his settled views.
To conclude with a succinct assessment: This is an excellent book. One 
can read it with great profit not only because of the important topics cov-
ered but also because of the way in which Quinn approaches these issues. 
Having offered this assessment, I should probably note, in the interest of 
full disclosure, that Quinn directed my dissertation. My interactions with 
him allowed me to experience his exemplary spirit: he was conscientious, 
forthright, helpful, honest, kind, and thoughtful, to name just a few of 
his virtues. Discussing philosophy with him was a cooperative enterprise, 
not a competitive one. Most happily, those who did not get a chance to 
interact personally with him can, in these essays, catch a glimpse of these 
and related virtues that are worthy of emulation: a piercingly clear writ-
ing style that effectively gets to the heart of a philosophical issue, personal 
engagement with and Socratic self-reflection on crucial issues (as seen in 
the quotation above), prioritizing intellectual honesty over argumentative 
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“one-upmanship” (see some of his gracious concessions in the debate with 
Plantinga on religious epistemology: “The Foundations of Theism Again: 
A Rejoinder to Plantinga”), and exhibiting the way in which crisp philo-
sophical thinking can be informed by the history of philosophy and litera-
ture, perhaps best exemplified in Quinn’s riveting treatment of Shusaku 
Endo’s novel silence in his “Tragic Dilemmas, Suffering Love, and Chris-
tian Life.” Surely these essays bear vivid testimony to the fact that the 
philosophical landscape is a richer place because of Philip Quinn.1
1Thanks to T. Allan Hillman, Christian Miller and Ted Poston for comments on drafts of 
this review.
was Jesus God?, by Richard Swinburne. Oxford University Press, 2008. 175 
pp. $24.95 (hardback)
GLENN B. SINISCALCHI, Duquesne University
A little over ten years ago, Pope John Paul II urged philosophers to provide 
bold arguments to establish the preconditions of divine revelation: “Con-
sider, for example, the natural knowledge of God, the possibility of dis-
tinguishing divine Revelation from other phenomena or the recognition 
of its credibility, the capacity of human language to speak in a true and 
meaningful way even of things which transcend all human experience.”1 
Other than being one of the world’s finest Christian philosophers and the 
author of many books and articles on various philosophical topics, Rich-
ard Swinburne has faithfully served the Church with an apologetic vision 
that is clear, courageous, and convincing. His most recent book on the 
subject is no different.
Although was Jesus God? is not as philosophically rigorous as his tril-
ogy on the philosophy of religion, it can be read as a sequel to any of 
his previous publications on natural theology. Because he focuses on the 
reasons to believe in Jesus’s divinity in this volume, he does not provide a 
new battery of arguments for God’s existence which can only show that a 
“bare” or “bland” theism is true. So long as one assumes that God exists, 
the reader will be able to benefit from Swinburne’s newest rationale to be-
lieve in Jesus. “Christian theism,” he rightly points out, “can be true only 
if bare theism is true” (p. 23).
The first prong in the overall argument for Jesus’s divinity consists of 
the pertinent reasons that can be utilized apart from the influence of di-
vine revelation to show that God is the kind of God who would want to 
become a human and do the types of things that Jesus would do. Thus, 
Swinburne’s first goal is to describe and explain the “a priori reasons” for 
expecting God to become incarnate in human history. A priori reasons 
1John Paul II, Fides et ratio, N. 67. 
